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FLAWED ECONOMIC
ASSUMPTIONS: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES
Mortgage Market Reform and the
Fallacy of Self-Correcting Markets
Robin Paul Malloy
I. Introduction
Markets are the product of volitional arrangements that
incentivize particular networks and patterns of exchange.1 The
  
Copyright 2009 by Robin Paul Malloy. The author and the PACE LAW
REVIEW have full rights to this article. Malloy is E.I. White Chair and
Distinguished Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law;; Series
Editor (with Blanck), DISABILITY LAW AND POLICY Book Series (Cambridge
University Press);; Series Editor, LAW, PROPERTY AND SOCIETY Book Series
(Ashgate Publishing);; and Series Editor (with Ghosh) LAW AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP Book Series (Edward Elgar Publishing). In addition to
numerous books and articles on law and market theory, as well as real estate
transactions and development, he is the author, with James C. Smith, of
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS (2007), now in its third edition from Aspen
Publishing. This article was prepared for a special symposium issue of the
PACE LAW REVIEW on Real Property, Mortgages, and the Economy: A Call for
Ethics and Reforms. The author is pleased to have been invited to participate
in the live symposium held on March 20, 2009, at Pace University School of
Law, and is happy to contribute his article to this very important issue of the
PACE LAW REVIEW. The author would like to thank Anthony Rapa for helpful
research assistance in preparing notes for this article. Some of the ideas
addressed in this article were developed for a presentation at the University
of Glasgow for a meeting addressing The Future of Financial Regulation and
the author thanks participants in that meeting for their helpful comments. A
related but much shorter and more general discussion of some of these ideas
will appear as a chapter in a forthcoming book from that conference, entitled
IAIN MACNEIL & JUSTIN 2·%RIEN, THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION
(forthcoming 2009).
1. See DANIEL W. BROMLEY, SUFFICIENT REASON: VOLITIONAL PRAGMATISM
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sustainability of any given set of market relationships,
therefore, depends on the goals to be achieved and the
appropriateness of the established incentive structure. These
incentivized relationships are subject to numerous influences
and dynamics requiring careful supervision, continuous re-
evaluation, and regularized adjustments over time. In this
context, the current crisis in U.S. housing and mortgage
markets reflects poorly incentivized exchange relationships.
The current situation cannot simply be blamed on meaningless
PHWDSKRUVUHODWHGWREHLQJFDXJKWLQ´WKHSHUIHFWVWRUP.µ The
crisis in the United States, which also underlies the crisis
globally, stems from an overly optimistic view of self-regulating
markets and of the belief in an unregulated ´invisible hand.µ2
  
AND THE MEANING OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

(2006).
2. The reference here is to Adam Smith and his famous metaphor of the
invisible hand. Adam Smith mentions the idea of the invisible hand in his
work, The Wealth of Nations and also in his earlier work on The Theory of
Moral Sentiments. Below are samples quotes from each book. With respect
to the actions of a person following his own self-interest, Smith observed that:
He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. . . . [B]y
directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may
be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and
he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.
Nor is it always worse for society that it was no part of it.
By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of
society more effectively than when he really intends to
promote it.
1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
NATIONS 477-78 (Edwin Cannon, ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (1776).

OF

The rich only select from the heap what is most precious
and agreeable. . . . [I]n spite of their natural selfishness and
rapacity, though they mean only their own conveiniency,
though the sole end which they propose from the labours of
all the thousands, whom they employ, be the gratification of
their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the
poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by
an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of
the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had
the earth been divided into equal portions among all its
inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing
it, advance the interest of the society . . . .
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It is not a storm caused by nature;; it is the product of human
action and inaction resulting from a lingering belief in laissez-
faire.
The current situation calls for volitional and purposeful
regulation of mortgage markets. Simply throwing money at
banks, lenders, and defaulting borrowers is not enough.3 There
is a need to examine and reform current market operations.
Significantly, it should be noted that the need for examination
and reform is not the same as suggesting the elimination of
secondary mortgage markets. In fact, we need secondary
markets for mortgages and securitization to facilitate economic
development, risk spreading, and enhanced liquidity.
This Article examines the mortgage market meltdown from
the perspective of market exchange theory, or what I have
elsewhere referred to as law and market economy.4 From this
perspective, I examine the exchange relationships among
primary and secondary mortgage market participants in an
effort to identify potential problems and to offer some
suggestions for reform.
While there are many issues that might be addressed in
considering all of the various elements of the U.S. mortgage
  
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 304 (E.G. West, ed., Liberty
Classics 1969) (1759).
3. We need structural change in the way in which we incentivize
exchange relationships. While supportive funding may be important, it must
be accompanied with action to change the way in which exchange is taking
place. Reform is needed so as to improve current market operations. See
infra discussion Part IV (suggesting specific steps that can be taken to
positively change the current networks and patterns of exchange in the
primary market).
4. See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY: REINTERPRETING
THE VALUES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000) [hereinafter MALLOY, MARKET
ECONOMY];; ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN
INTRODUCTION TO MARKET CONCEPTS IN LEGAL REASONING (2004) [hereinafter
MALLOY, MARKET CONTEXT]. A major idea expressed in each book is that
markets are about exchange and not simply about an amoral calculus of
choice. It is important to understand such things as who initiates exchange,
what is permitted to be exchanged, on what terms does exchange take place,
and what remedies are available for breach. There are socio-economic and
racial dimensions to exchange relationships. Moreover, in exchange theory,
we understand that choice is always preceded by belief, and therefore it is
important to study the fixation of belief from the perspective of cultural-
interpretation theory. Exchange takes place in a social context and involves
complex dynamics unable to be fully captured in the economics of the self-
interested pursuit of wealth maximization.
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market, I focus my analysis on an evaluation of the underlying
real estate transaction and the related activities of the primary
mortgage market. I do this because of time and space
limitations and because I believe we need to have a sound
regulatory approach to the underlying real estate transaction if
we want to ultimately have improved financial regulation of
the secondary market, as well as of the market for mortgage
related securities.
In developing this argument I proceed in several steps.
First, I discuss the fallacy of self-correcting markets as a way of
explaining the need for volitional and purposeful regulation in
the housing and mortgage markets. Second, I provide an
overview of the basic exchange relationships among the parties
involved in the underlying real estate transaction, those in the
primary and secondary mortgage market, and potential
investors in mortgage related securities. And third, I suggest a
series of regulatory reforms for improving the soundness of the
underlying real estate transaction and the operation of the
primary mortgage markets. These reforms include measures
that fall into three thematic categories: taking steps to reduce
speculation in housing prices;; eliminating incentives for over-
borrowing and over-lending;; and adjusting the structure of the
underlying real estate transaction to undermine the incentive
for degraded transactions and the tendency toward an inverse
SULVRQHU·VGLOHPPDSUREOHP5
II. The Fallacy of Self-Correcting Markets
Markets are not objects that can be observed and studied
as something real. Markets are dynamic and involve the
complex human activity of exchange. Markets, much like legal
systems, can be informal or formal. Most modern markets of
major significance, however, tend to be formal and are the
institutional product of human action. In particular, housing
and mortgage markets are formal institutional frameworks
that rely on legal infrastructure to facilitate long distance and
impersonal exchange networks of trade and exchange. Distant
  
5. See, e.g., MALLOY, MARKET CONTEXT, supra note 4, at 130-32. See
generally, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners· Dilemma:
Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209 (2009).
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investors, lenders, buyers and sellers all rely on a belief in the
soundness of housing and mortgage market institutions in
order to facilitate a complex set of exchanges.
Economists often talk about markets as if they are real
objects and as if people simply find themselves placed in
naturally existing market environments in which they respond
to stimuli by taking self-interested actions to maximize their
own wealth. This idea of the market as a real place is,
however, a metaphor, as are the many models that economists
generate and use to describe markets.6 7KHHFRQRPLVWV·LGHa of
the market is a representation or model of the underlying
networks and patterns of human exchange;; it is not itself the
real to which it refers, just as a map of a given city or of the
world is not the real to which it makes reference.7 Such maps
and models are always partial and incomplete even though
they may serve to convey important information with respect to
certain characteristics or qualities of the real that they
represent.8
These models are constructed within the
assumptions of economics which function as a kind of math-
based sociology in an effort to describe the process of human
exchange.
In explaining their models of market behavior, economists
often speak in terms of markets as being ´self-correcting.µ
When one speaks in terms of self-correcting markets one offers
DQ LWHUDWLRQ RQ$GDP6PLWK·V invisible hand metaphor.9 This
means that markets are suggested to be real, physical places
capable of automatically adjusting to continuously changing
circumstances, and doing so in a way that simultaneously
maximizes efficiency and wealth for individuals and the public
alike.10 According to some, all of this happens as if the market
  
6. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY,
IF YOU·RE SO SMART: THE NARRATIVE OF ECONOMIC EXPERTISE (1990);; DEIRDRE
N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1998).
7. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET
CONTEXT, supra note 4.
8. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET
CONTEXT, supra note 4.
9. See supra note 2.
10. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 4, 88, 127, 138, 150
(noting that efficiency is a complex and ambiguous concept as any
distribution can be efficient, and no optimal course of action can be
determined in a complex system);; MALLOY, MARKET CONTEXT, supra note 4, at
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were being directed by an invisible hand. The upshot of this,
however, is a belief that such a model renders unnecessary
most, if not all, government regulation of the market. If
markets are real, natural, and continuously self-balancing,
there is little for government to do. This belief, however,
ignores the fact that formal markets are the institutional
products of volitional human action, and these institutions both
constrain and incentivize particular networks and patterns of
exchange;; they privilege particular types of transactions and
approaches to transactions, even if they do not dictate a given
individual exchange.
Economists also speak in terms of self-correcting prices but
this is a matter quite different from the assertion of self-
correcting markets. Price is simply an interpretation of value
and any given set of prices reflect value differences among and
between available items within a given institutional market
framework.11 As relative value changes within a given system,
prices adjust to signal the relative changes. The process of
signally relative changes in underlying values within a given
system is different than saying that the institutional product of
human action itself is self-correcting.12
In part, the current crisis in the U.S. housing and
mortgage market results from a misunderstanding of markets
on the part of government policy makers and regulators.13
  
27-30 (noting that 6PLWK·V LQYLVLEOH KDQG WKHRU\ LV RIWHQ SUHVHQWHG DV DQ
invariance argument in support of a claim that private parties pursuing their
own self-interest end up promoting, in an equivalent fashion, the public
interest. There is, however, variance between private interest and public
interest ² meaning that there are inequalities between marginal public costs
and benefits, as well as marginal private costs and benefits.).
11. Price, as an interpretation of value, is a well-accepted concept in
semiotics;; as an interpretation of value, it is relational with respect to other
available options. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 18-20, 30-
32, 45-46.
12. A major element of a sound market exchange process is that prices
are permitted to equilibrate freely so that relative values can be signaled to
participants in exchange. This permits a good flow of information regarding
the prioritization of system-based incentive structures.
13. See Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Flaws in Deregulatory
Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at B1;; Rick Brooks, The United States of
Subprime;; Data Shows Bad Loans Permeate the Nation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11,
2007, at A1;; Phil Gramm, Deregulation and the Financial Panic, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 20, 2009, at A17;; Kara Scannell, Greenspan Admits Errors to Panel,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2008, at A15;; John B. Taylor, How Government Created
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Under the Bush administration, singing in harmony with the
Chicago School law and economics types, markets were
understood as self-correcting and capable of coordinating
complex exchanges with little or no need for government
interference or oversight. Market analysis is presented as a
rational and self-interested calculus of choice designed to
promote efficiency and the maximization of wealth.14 The
problem with the Chicago School approach is that it fails to
understand the distinction between economics and markets,
and more particularly, the economic analysis of law and the
idea of law in a market context.15 Economics is an academic
discipline grounded around certain assumptions and principles
that define its mode of inquiry from that of other social sciences
and forms of thinking.16 Like other fields of academic inquiry
that approach law and policy, economics helps one to organize
interesting questions and uncover valuable insights. Also like
other fields of social inquiry it is not fully determinate and is
limited in its ability to represent the real world of exchange to
which it refers. Moreover, while it is important to consider law
in its market context, this is quite different from suggesting
that law can be optimized via an economic calculus.17
In reality, markets are about the networks and patterns of
exchange and not the economic calculus of choice.18 Markets
involve communities of interaction and the establishment of
cultural-interpretive norms of exchange. In markets, self-
interest is informed by a dynamic relationship between the
  
the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2009, at A19. Fixing the problem is
also proving difficult for policy makers. For example, early efforts at
modifying individual home mortgages to avoid foreclosure revealed that
´[m]ore than half of homeowners fell behind on mortgage payments in the
first six months after their loans were modified.µ Ruth Simon, Easing
Mortgages ,VQ·W D 3DQDFHD ² Bank Data Show Many Homeowners Falling
Behind Soon After Loans are Modified, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2008, at A4.
14. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET
CONTEXT, supra note 4.
15. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET
CONTEXT, supra note 4.
16. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET
CONTEXT, supra note 4.
17. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET
CONTEXT, supra note 4.
18. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET
CONTEXT, supra note 4.
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individual and the community, and price is understood as an
interpretation of value and not value itself.19 In looking at law
in a market context, we understand the significance of market
dynamics and economic insights, and at the same time,
recognize that there is no way to identify an optimal legal rule
or course of action, that efficiency is an ambiguous concept that
can be easily manipulated, and that wealth maximization
simply maximizes an institutional bias in favor of those who
already have wealth.20 Economics is simply a stylized way of
representing particular aspects of the exchange process. It is
one way of interpreting elements of the complex human
experience of exchange, and as such, it is always and
everywhere partial and incomplete in its ability to represent
that to which it makes reference.21 Nonetheless, policy makers
and government officials invoke economic models as rhetorical
devices to promote amoral and strategic game-like behavior
wherein the accumulation of wealth is celebrated as the
highest claim to success, achievement, and social worth. The
ultimate display of the failure of the Chicago School approach
to treating law as the object of economic calculus is the collapse
of the housing and mortgage markets.22
Markets are not self correcting in economic terms. In
economic terms, markets have to be defined, rights assigned,
allocation rules established, and other institutional structures
put in place. With a given approach to trade and exchange,
people can interact in accordance with the established rules of
the game and prices will adjust in a price system to reflect
relative values among competing goods and resources. Prices
in this system are self-correcting precisely because they are
simply markers or signs of relative relationships between
values in a given institutional or environmental context. These
institutional structures and practices stay in place as long as
  
19. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET
CONTEXT, supra note 4.
20. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET
CONTEXT, supra note 4.
21. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET
CONTEXT, supra note 4.
22. The size of the worldwide losses on bad loans and securitization are
estimated to be $4.1 trillion, according to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). Harry Maurer & Cristina Linblad, One Nasty Slump, BUS. WK., May
4, 2009, at 5.
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there is a belief in their ability to promote and deliver
particular value-based outcomes in a cost-effective manner.23
With globalization, pressing social and environmental
problems, and dramatic disparities in access to resources, the
American narrative of the unfettered and individual pursuit of
wealth and greed is coming to a rapid demise;; as practiced, it is
simply no longer credible to many people.
Markets are built on trust, duty, prudence, loyalty,
tradition, discipline and rules. Markets do not function in an
amoral context. Markets are about people exchanging and
interacting in community, and more and more people are
realizing that markets are not self-correcting. Rather, people
correct markets and people change the institutional structures
and incentives.24 The misplaced belief in the idea of self-
correcting markets allowed housing and mortgage markets to
be exploited and degraded by actors seeking only to maximize
their own self gain.
Housing and mortgage markets have been and continue to
be heavily subsidized and supported by active government
intervention to achieve cost-effective outcomes in housing
policy.25 This is perhaps one of the most ironic elements of the
claim by law and economics types that markets are self-
correcting and natural.
Modern housing and mortgage
markets function as clear examples of institutionally created
and managed exchange networks, making it difficult to believe
that the people who created these markets think that they are
actually self-forming and re-forming.
In earlier days, people typically either bought property for
cash, as part of a service for ownership arrangement, or on
credit terms of a short duration such as five years.26 This kept
RZQHUVKLS UDWHV UHODWLYHO\ ORZ E\ WRGD\·V VWDQGDUGV27 In an
  
23. The focus on belief is important as a precursor to choice in the
semiotics of Charles S. Peirce and his theory of abductive logic. See
BROMLEY, supra note 1, at 19, 88-151;; MALLOY, MARKET CONTEXT, supra note
4, at 93-104.
24. See BROMLEY, supra note 1, at 1-19.
25. See
generally AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS (Nestor M. Davidson & Robin Paul Malloy, eds., 2009).
26. See generally Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market: A
Catalyst for Change in Real Estate Transactions, 39 SW. L.J. 991 (1986).
27. At the time of World War II homeownership rates in the United
States were at about 43.6%;; as of 2004 they were at about 70%. ROBIN PAUL
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effort to purposefully advance access to ownership and increase
ownership rates, the government created special lending
institutions, mortgage forms, and lending regulations.28 After
World War II, government-sponsored activities expanded.
Using the Federal Housing Administration, Veterans
Administration, and other loan devices, along with efforts by
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae, the government
intervened to create a much expanded credit market in support
of residential home ownership.29 These interventions provided
low-cost mortgage loans, extended the length of credit
repayment terms, and provided mortgage insurance that was
particularly important to borrowers in need of low down
payments.30 By the year 1980, the government had created an
even more expansive market for housing credit with its
development of the secondary mortgage market.31 This new
market further extended affordable credit for home ownership,
and offered greater liquidity and risk reduction for primary
mortgage market lenders. Primary market lenders could then
enjoy a ready market for the sale of the mortgage loans that
they originated. Furthermore, the amount of loanable funds
increased dramatically as mortgage-related securities were
sold through general capital markets to investors who had
previously not purchased market instruments from real estate
related intermediaries²or at least not instruments that
pushed money back into further loan originations and
additional real estate transactions.
Government involvement was critical for the development
of the secondary mortgage market for several reasons. First,
developing a fully functioning and national market for
  
MALLOY & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 313-14 (3d ed.
2007). In more recent years, the U.S. homeownership rates have generally
been in the mid-to-high 60% rate, with the time period between 1994 and
2004 showing significant increases in the diversity of the home-owning
population. Id.
28. See id. at 379-83;; ROBIN PAUL MALLOY & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, REAL
ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 725-50 (1st ed. 1998);; GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A.
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 916-1011 (5th ed. 2007).
29. See generally Malloy, supra note 26;; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note
28.
30. See generally Malloy, supra note 26;; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note
28.
31. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 379-83;; MALLOY & SMITH,
supra note 28, at 725-50;; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 28, at 916-1011.
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individual home mortgages that originated in banks from coast
to coast raised tremendous coordination problems. Second,
state law involving property, mortgages, and foreclosure varied
among the States, raising huge transaction costs for
coordinating information, documentation, and the pooling of
mortgages.32 Third, the technology for tracking the details,
monthly payments, and other requirements of millions of
discrete home mortgages was extremely difficult to organize
without major investments in integrated technology systems
and protocols that could only reasonably result from federal
involvement. And fourth, it is unlikely that many private
investors would have invested in the mortgage-related
securities without an understanding that they were to have
indirect, if not direct, government backing.33 This not only
reduced investment risk generally, but it also made the
mortgage backed securities more competitive with private
securities by reducing the discount that would otherwise have
been applied to these offerings.34
With the secondary market, the government created and
sponsored the institutional framework for transforming
mortgages into securities capable of attracting resources from
the general capital markets. The history of housing and
mortgage markets in the United States is one of continuous
and purposeful adjustment and readjustment of institutionally
incentivized exchange relationships, and not one of self-
emerging and self-correcting markets.35
  
32. See generally DAVID S. HILL & CAROL BROWN, BASIC MORTGAGE LAW
(2007);; MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27;; MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 28;;
Malloy, supra note 26;; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 28;; Gant S. Nelson &
Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Non-Judicial
Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399 (2004).
33. See generally Richard Scott Carnell, Handling the Failure of a
Government-Sponsored Enterprise, 80 WASH. L. REV. 565 (2005);; David Reiss,
7KH )HGHUDO *RYHUQPHQW·V ,PSOLHG *XDUDQWHH RI )DQQLH 0DH DQG )UHGGLH
0DF·V 2EOLJDWLRQV 8QFOH 6DP Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019
(2008).
34. Joseph Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization:
Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1383
(1991).
35. For a discussion of federal taxation subsidies, see generally Chad D.
Emerson, All Sprawled Out: How the Federal Regulatory System Has Driven
Unsustainable Growth, 75 TENN. L. REV. 411, 423 (2008);; M.H. Hoeflich &
John E. Thies, Rethinking American Housing Policy: Defederalizing
Subsidized Housing, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 629 (1987);; and Roberta F. Mann,
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This background helps put into context an October 24,
2008, report in the Wall Street Journal by economist and
former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, declaring
KLV ´VKRFNHG GLVEHOLHIµ WKDW ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV KDG IDLOHG WR
protect themselves from risk tied to mortgage securities.36 It
was a statement of shock that has been much ridiculed as one
of not understanding that self-interested people often do not in
fact end up promoting the public interest and for continuing to
believe that markets are continuously self-correcting as if lead
by an invisible hand with no need for regulation or appropriate
oversight.
In my mind, *UHHQVSDQ·VVKRFNHGGLVEHOLHIHFKRes a classic
line from the film Casablanca when Claude Rains, as Captain
5HQDXOWLVRUGHUHGE\WKH*HUPDQVWRVKXWGRZQ5LFN·V&DIé.37
5HQDXOW TXLSV WKDW KH KDV QR OHJDO UHDVRQ WR FORVH 5LFN·V WR
  
The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347 (2000). For a discussion
on the history of FHA and VA loans, see Adam Gordon, The Creation of
Homeownership: How New Deal Changes in Banking Regulation
Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to Whites and Out of Reach
for Blacks, 115 YALE L.J. 186, 194-96 (2005);; and Florence Wagman Roisman,
National Ingratitude: The Egregious DeficiHQFLHV RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV·
+RXVLQJ 3URJUDPV IRU 9HWHUDQV DQG WKH ´3XEOLF 6FDQGDOµ RI 9HWHUDQV·
Homelessness, 38 IND. L. REV. 103, 112-46 (2005). See also generally Quintin
Johnstone, Private Mortgage Insurance, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783 (2004).
For a discussion on the gRYHUQPHQW·V UROH LQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH
secondary mortgage market, see Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the
$PHULFDQ 'UHDP $ &ULWLFDO (YDOXDWLRQ RI WKH )HGHUDO *RYHUQPHQW·V
Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 394-97 (1994);; and
Cathy Lesser Mansfield, 7KH5RDGWR6XESULPH´+HOµWas Paved With Good
Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity
Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 476 (2000). )RUDGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW·V
role in the creation of uniform lending documents, see Christopher L.
Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2226-27
(2007);; and see generally Arthur W. Leibold, Jr., Uniform Conventional
Mortgage Documents: FHLMC Style, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 435 (1972).
For a history of the gRYHUQPHQW·V UROH LQ FUHDWLQJ )DQQLH 0DH DQG )UHGGLH
Mac, see generally Carnell, supra note 33;; Reiss, supra note 33.
36. Scannell, supra note 13 (noting that the Federal Reserve Chairman,
Alan Greenspan, GHFODUHG KLV ´VKRFNHG GLVEHOLHIµ WKDW ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV
had failed to protect themselves from risks tied to mortgage securities, and
that ´*UHHQVSDQ VDLG KH PDGH ¶a mistake· in his hands-off regulatory
philosophy, which many now blame in part for sparking the global economic
troubles. . . . He conceded that he has ¶found a flaw· in his ideology and said
he was ¶distressed by that.·µ).
37. CASABLANCA (Warner Brothers 1943). See also HOWARD KOCH,
CASABLANCA: SCRIPT AND LEGEND 176-77 (1992).
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ZKLFKWKH*HUPDQV FRPPDQG ´ILQG RQHµ38 In manufacturing
an excuse to legally close the Café, Captain Renault walks
toward the casino, collects his gambling payout for the night,
and simultaneously declares to Rick (played by Humphrey
Bogart) that the Café must be closed immediately, as he is
´VKRFNHG VKRFNHG WR ILQG JDPEOLQJ LV JRLQJ RQ LQ KHUHµ39 Of
FRXUVH &ODXGH 5DLQV·s lines were delivered for amusement
ZKHUHDV *UHHQVSDQ·V VKRFNHG GLsbelief reveals something
tragic in the regulatory ideology of the United States. For
Greenspan to be in shocked disbelief demonstrates either an
ideological commitment to certain assumptions that are so deep
that they blinded his perception of the reality going on around
him, or a level of disingenuous rhetoric that is in its own way
as lacking in credibility as the declaration of Captain Renault
in Casablanca.
The bottom line is that markets are not, and should not be,
self-correcting. The fallacy of self-correcting markets and the
false rhetoric of the neoclassical law and economics types is one
of promoting the idea of the market as a desirable end in itself.
Markets are not an end, they are a means;; specifically, they are
a means for arranging exchange networks in ways that permit
individuals and communities to cost effectively pursue
volitional goals and objectives that they believe are
normatively, ethically and aesthetically desirable.40 Markets
are shaped by public policy and need regulation and oversight
to continuously confirm their cost-effective ability to assist in
the achievement of the desired ends. Real estate markets are
no exception.
III. A Real Estate Transactions Perspective
on Mortgage Markets
Real estate transactions involve the capturing and creating
RIYDOXHIURPH[FKDQJH,VRPHWLPHVUHIHUWRWKLVDV´SURSHUW\
in action.µ  7KURXJK WUDGH DQG H[FKDQJH RSSRUWXQLWLHV IRU
capturing and creating value emerge and these opportunities
  
38. CASABLANCA, supra note 37. See also KOCH, supra note 37, at 176-77.
39. CASABLANCA, supra note 37. See also KOCH, supra note 37, at 176-77.
40. See generally MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 106-40;;
BROMLEY, supra note 1.
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incentivize further trades and exchanges. These underlying
transactions occur at the primary market level and form the
ground and foundation for secondary market activities such as
those in the secondary mortgage market.
This part of the article addresses the exchange
relationships among key participants in the primary market,
the secondary market, and the third party investors in
mortgage related securities. It finishes with a brief discussion
on the regulatory importance of dealing with the underlying
real estate transaction as fundamental to any effort to reform
the secondary market and its securities based operations.
A. The Primary Market
At the core of every transaction in mortgaged backed
securities is an underlying transaction in real estate. Thus, we
need to understand the nature and quality of the underlying
transaction if we hope to get a handle on the current crisis in
financial markets.
In a basic home sale transaction we have three
transactional perspectives to consider.41 The primary parties
to a purchase and sale agreement are the buyer and the seller
of the property. The secondary parties to this transaction are
those who are engaged in administrative and managerial
transactions related to the basic purchase and sale agreement.
These parties may typically include: brokers, attorneys, a title
company, an insurance company, a surveyor, and a loan
originator for the mortgage loan. The transcendent third
parties are not directly involved in the deal but have a
potential future interest in the underlying transaction. These
include people meant to be protected by the maintenance of the
public records and potential investors further down the
transactional chain, or potential future buyers and creditors.42
The basic exchange relationship of a real estate
transaction is illustrated in Diagram I, below.

  
41. See generally MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27 (discussing basic
coverage of the various aspects of law important to real estate transactions).
42. See id. at 231-68 (discussing the public records).
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Deed
BUYER

SELLER
Cash

Cash

Note & Mortgage

LENDER
DIAGRAM I. REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS AND THE
PRIMARY MORTGAGE MARKET
The basic real estate transaction is illustrated in Diagram
I. Seller conveys the agreed upon interest in property to the
buyer for a benefit.43 A typical transaction involves a money
payment in exchange for delivery of a deed. Frequently the
buyer does not pay the full purchase price out of her own
resources. Instead the transaction is leveraged as the buyer
finances a large portion of the expense.44 This is shown on the
left-vertical side of the diagram. In a standard home loan, the
lender of the funds secures the repayment of the loan with a
promissory note and a mortgage. This provides a conditional
claim to the property in the event that the buyer/borrower does
not live up to the terms of the promise to repay.
This set of exchange relationships can be very much
localized in the absence of a secondary market for mortgages.45
In such a case, the lender would make the loan and hold it in
its investment loan portfolio.46 The lender would need to
  
43. See id. at 1-180 (discussing basic contract considerations).
44. See id. at 367-510 (discussing basic mortgage considerations).
45. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 50-57 (discussing
how the secondary mortgage market transformed the local home financing
system).
46. See generally MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27;; MALLOY & SMITH,
supra note 28.
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maintain a positive spread between its cost of funds and the
return on its investments.47 In the event that risky loans are
made, it would impact on the financial stability of the lender
and any losses would be borne by that institution.
The relationships in this exchange situation establish a
congruence of interest between borrower and lender, at least to
the extent that each wants the underlying deal and its
documentation to be correct, enforceable, and consistent with
their risk and investment expectations. As to sellers, once they
get their cash they often have little interest in what happens
next, unless they have some serious continuing liability under
the terms of the conveyance. Such a continuing liability is
likely to arise under the instrument of conveyance, and
typically not on the contract, because of the doctrine of
merger.48
In securing financing for the purchase of the property,
buyer enters the primary mortgage market. Diagram II, below,
illustrates the basic exchange relationships in the primary
mortgage market.

  
  
  
  
  
  
DIAGRAM  II.    THE  PRIMARY  MORTGAGE  MARKET49  
  
47. See generally MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27;; MALLOY & SMITH,
supra note 28.
48. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 145-52 (discussing the
doctrine of merger).
49. MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 380 (used with permission). For
background on primary markets, see also Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in
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In Diagram II, we see the primary transaction as it
appears when a primary mortgage market is established to
interface with other financial networks. In this diagram we see
that savers and borrowers have options in the marketplace.
There are multiple sources for lending and multiple places to
LQYHVWRQH·VVDYLQJV)LQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDULHVIXQFWLRQWREULQJ
savers and borrowers together and make a profit by keeping a
positive spread between their cost of funds and the return on
their investments.
In real estate transactions we have
intermediaries that deal in mortgages;; they compete for
savers/investors against other types of investments available in
the broader capital markets, such as the market for corporate
stocks and bonds. The lenders that make the loans to the
parties in the underlying real estate transaction are the
originators of the primary mortgages. They often use in-house
or external mortgage brokers who work for fees and
commissions to originate the mortgages. Primary lenders
should basically provide confirmation as to certain aspects of
the underlying real estate transaction by verifying such things
as the title and property appraisal value in relation to the
contract, mortgage, and price terms. This verification process
should be based on underwriting standards meant to reduce
the risk of default.
B. The Secondary Market
The secondary mortgage market creates opportunities for
primary lenders to sell the mortgages that they originate.50
This enhances liquidity, reduces risk by diversifying the
primaU\ OHQGHU·V LQYHVWPHQW SRUWIROLR DQG LQFUHDVHV WKH
  
Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the Social Capital Response, 56
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 285 (2008);; Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A
Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX.
L. REV. 1255, 1278-79 (2002);; and Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global
Implications of the Securitization of U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J.
77, 79-80 (2008). See also generally Peterson, supra note 35, at 2199;; Ronald
K. Schuster, Lending Discrimination: Is the Secondary Market Helping to
0DNHWKH´$PHULFDQ'UHDPµD5HDOLW\", 36 GONZ. L. REV. 153, 155-57 (2000-
2001).
50. See generally MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27;; MALLOY & SMITH,
supra note 28;; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 28;; Malloy, supra note 26;;
supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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available funds for lending by recharging the assets of the
primary lender.51 There are both public- and private-related
entities functioning as secondary mortgage market
intermediaries.
They buy and sell loans and loan
participations, as well as package loans into pools for
securitization. They issue various mortgage related securities
and bonds, and sell them into the financial markets.52
Diagram III, below, illustrates the basic exchange relationships
of the secondary mortgage market.
The secondary mortgage market not only creates a market
for primary mortgages, but it also changes the underlying
relationships in the primary market. Prior to the secondary
market·V emergence around 1980, the primary lenders
originated and held their loans.53 This gave them a vested
interest in the quality of the loans and in maintaining good
relations with their customers. With the rise of the secondary
market, primary lenders were able to sell the mortgages at par
(face value and without a discount)54 to recharge their assets,
and this provided the opportunity to make money from fees for
generating new mortgages rather than from simply originating
and holding loans as an investment. In this new situation,
lenders shifted their focus to providing services and products
welcomed by the secondary market intermediaries.55 The local
homebuyer seeking a loan became much less significant to
banking operations as money was to be made in churning the
paper of loan originations rather than by cultivating
relationships based on long-term lend and hold investment
  
51. See generally MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27;; MALLOY & SMITH,
supra note 28;; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 28;; Malloy, supra note 26;;
supra note 27 and accompanying text.
52. For additional background on issues related to the secondary
mortgage market and securitization, see generally Kenneth C. Kettering,
Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product
Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553 (2008);; and David Reiss, Subprime
Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to Flourish
in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985 (2006).
53. See generally Malloy, supra note 26.
54. One way this is done is by using points that can be passed on to the
borrower as closing costs, with the points covering the amount that otherwise
would be discounted against face value. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27,
at 383-84.
55. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 50-57. See generally
Malloy, supra note 26.
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strategies.56 Transactions became more uniform, standardized,
and driven by a desire for fee and servicing income based on
relatively quick sales of mortgages to the secondary market
intermediaries.57
The secondary market also created an exchange
environment that influenced behavior in the primary market,
beyond that of switching from a loan and hold, to a fund and
sell operation.
Primary lenders began to adjust their
underwriting standards and their risk tolerance based on the
willingness of secondary market intermediaries to take non-
conforming and subprime loans.58 As long as there was a
market for what they originated, the primary lenders could
simply collect their fees and sell the loan off to recharge their
asset-base and make more fee income.
The underlying
economic goal of this behavior was QRW WR OLPLW RQH·V VHOI WR
some personal or idealized standard of loan quality, but to
maximize profit based on what one can sell in the relevant
secondary market.
The underwriting standards of the
secondary market intermediaries (the entities purchasing loans
from originators in the primary market) changed over time,
making it easier to fund more borrowers for home mortgages.
As the secondary market underwriting standards were made
easier, primary market originators adjusted their activities to
reflect tolerance for greater risk.

  
56. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 50-57. See generally
Malloy, supra note 26.
57. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 50-57. See generally
Malloy, supra note 26.
58. For a discussion on these lowered lending standards, see generally
Brescia, supra note 49, at 295;; Benjamin Howell, Exploiting Race and Space:
Concentrated Subprime Lending as Housing Discrimination, 94 CAL. L. REV.
101, 124-27 (2006);; and Rayth T. Myers, Foreclosing on the Subprime Loan
Crisis: Why Current Regulations are Flawed and What is Needed to Stop
Another Crisis From Occurring, 87 OR. L. REV. 311, 313-16 (2008). Lower
standards also included use of negative amortization loans, and piggy back
financing, ZKHUHDOHQGHUZRXOGIXQGWKHERUURZHU·VHTXLW\UHTXLUHPHQW
with a second mortgage so that the borrower really had no equity in the
property. MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 383-99.
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DIAGRAM III. THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET59

  
59. MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 382 (used with permission).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/15

20

2009]

MORTGAGE MARKET REFORM

99

C. Third Party Investors
Third party investors purchase securities issued against
the anticipated and expected value of the cash flow on the
underlying mortgages associated with a given issue. The
underlying cash flow supports the value of the security but the
investor does not typically become an owner of the mortgage
loans themselves. On the other hand, some investors purchase
loan participations that give them direct rights to cash flow of a
given underlying mortgage or mortgages. In either situation,
early payoffs from refinancing can impact the expected value of
the cash flow, as can defaults and foreclosures. Thus, accurate
pricing and valuation depend on the quality of the underlying
transactions;; and, more particularly, on the quality, validity,
and authenticity of the information about the underlying
transactions.60
Investors have little firsthand knowledge of the underlying
documentation or of the legal rules applicable to the underlying
transaction. They rely on the basic uniformity of standardized
mortgage documents, and the fact that both the primary and
secondary intermediaries approved the loans. This reliance
factor is enhanced by the presence of two very dominant
entities with implicit, although not express, backing of the
United States Government: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In
fact, it is known that the Federal Government encouraged loan
originations based on new and lower underwriting standards.61
  
60. Much of what we do in a transactional law practice involves what I
KDYH FDOOHG ´WUDQVDFWLRQDO DXWKHQWLFDWLRQµ  7KLV PHDQV ZH VSHQG WLPH
confirming the authenticity of the buyer, seller, the documents, the property,
the reality of the mortgage, and the credit behind it, etc. These transactions
are in paper, or else take place as representations of the property and the
debt, and we must confirm that the representations are of something that is
real. For instance, the presence of a paper deed does not verify the existence
of the actual property to which the deed refers. As to pricing, there are a
number of issues, including calculation of the expected life of the mortgage as
opposed to its term. A typical residential mortgage will be for a stated term
of thirty years but in reality, the life will be very much shorter. This occurs
for several reasons, including a sale of the home, a refinance, or a default.
The typical American moves about every five years, for instance. See Robin
Paul Malloy, Inclusion by Design: Accessible Housing and Mobility
Impairment, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 726-28 (2009) (discussing housing
demographics).
61. See Russell Roberts, How Government Stoked the Mania, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 3, 2008, at A21. Congress pushed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to
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This was part of a volitional policy of enhancing home
ownership rates across more income ranges and all racial
categories by making it easier for more and more people to get
into a home.
In addition to encouraging greater flexibility and ease of
loan approval, the leadership of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
earned incentive pay and bonuses based on hitting and
exceeding targeted goals in loan originations made to people
who would not likely qualify under the standards for
traditional conventional mortgages.62
In this way the
organizations that many Americans mistakenly believed were
policing the mortgage markets were in fact being incentivized
to profit from lower standards of supervision and underwriting.
In fact, no government entity was supervising the mortgage
markets, given that Fannie and Freddie were not technically
government entities, and given that they had an incentive to
participate in bad practices rather than to actively regulate
against them.
In this rather odd arrangement, third party investors
relied on the approval of the secondary market intermediaries
as a form of confirmation as to the quality of the underlying
loans, and at the same time the secondary market
intermediaries relied on continuing investor interest as
confirmation of the market for its products. Thus, as long as
the products were able to find a market, they were believed to
be sound. In theory, if these products were not believed to be
sound, rational and self-interested actors would not buy them.
In the world of standard neoclassical economics, as used by
many law and economics practitioners, this is the world of self-
correcting markets and circular absurdity. The circularity of
the logic goes something like this: the securities being issued to
  
make more and more loans to people of lower income, and many of these
loans were in the troubled subprime mortgage markets. Id. ´)DQQLH DQG
Freddie played a significant role in the explosion of subprime mortgages and
subprime mortgage-EDFNHGVHFXULWLHVµId. See also Ruth Simon, Mortgages
Made in 2007 Go Bad at Rapid Clip, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2008, at A3.
´(YLGHQFH WKDW OD[ OHQGLQJ VWDQGDUGV ZHUH OHDGLQJ WR KLJKHU PRUWJDJH
delinquencies ILUVWHPHUJHGLQODWHµ Id.
62. See James R. Hagerty et al., After Fannie Shake-Up, Regulators
Focus on Pay, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2004, at A1;; James R. Hagerty, Fannie
Will Use New Benchmarks in Setting Incentive Pay for 2005, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 14, 2005, at A2.
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investors were good because the investors bought them, and
because the investors bought them, the intermediaries knew
that the new and lower underwriting standards were sound so
they could keep originating and selling these products.
In the process of packaging and selling mortgaged-based
securities, many complicated financing devices and insurance
arrangements obscured information for investors, but to a
certain extent the impact of the financial complications are
uncertain since many of the investors in these mortgage-
UHODWHG LQVWUXPHQWV ZHUH VLPSO\ EX\LQJ HDFK RWKHU·V
obligations. In other words, primary market originators were
also active investors;; thus, investors were, in part, buying each
RWKHU·VEDGORDQV63
The government-supported outcomes of this incentivized
market structure were that it did increase home ownership
rates across a diverse racial spectrum, and in addition, it added
to the growth of the money supply.64 In buying mortgages
through the secondary market, the government pumps money
into the mortgage markets and recharges the asset base of
primary mortgage lenders. In this way more money circulates
in the economy permitting a sense of economic growth. This is
an indirect way to mask a government stimulus package that
drives economic activity in the wake of rising deficits and bad
economic fundamentals due to huge expenditures allocated to
the War on Terror, rising oil prices, and unfavorable trade
balances. This method of expanding the money supply, via real
estate related financial intermediaries, helped fuel continuing
demand and thus speculation in housing markets.
  
63. See Paul Beckett & John Hechinger, ´Subprimeµ Could Be Bad News
for Banks ² Riskier Loans, Now Prevalent in Industry, Show Problems, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 9, 2001, at C1;; Carrick Mollenkamp, Faulty Assumptions: In
Home-Lending Push, Banks Misjudged Risk ² HSBC Borrowers Fall Behind
on Payments, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2007, at A1.
64. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 313-14 (increasing diversity
of home ownership);; Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and
Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 21-23 (2009). See
also Miriam Jordon, Housing Boom Aided Minorities, WALL ST. J., May 13,
2009, at A3. During the recent housing boom, minority home ownership
rates increased at a faster rate than that for whites. Id. The gains added a
lot to the diversity of ownership, but since the bust, homeownership rates
have fallen much more steeply for minorities than for whites. Id. This is in
part due to the fact that minority borrowers were much more likely to have a
subprime mortgage than whites. Id.
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D. The Importance of the Underlying Real Estate Transaction
It is important to focus on the underlying real estate
transaction in the primary market when considering the future
of secondary mortgage market activity. The quality and
reliability of the underlying transaction is directly linked to the
value of the mortgaged-based securities in the secondary
mortgage market, and thus regulatory reform is required in
both markets. One market deals with the property itself, as
represented in the deed and other closing documents, and the
other market deals in the representations of the underlying
transaction. An ability to create documentary representations
of property and then to deal in both the property and its
representations adds economic potential to the market.65
For example, by creating deeds, mortgages, and title
records we permit property owners to convey an interest in
land that can be recorded and used as collateral for borrowing
money. Here, the deed is a paper representation of rights of
ownership in the property and the mortgage represents a
contingent claim of a creditor to proceed against the property,
  
65. See MALLOY, MARKET CONTEXT, supra note 4, at 10, 82-84, 108-09;;
HERNANDO DESOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).
In the West, . . . every parcel of land, every building, every
piece of equipment, or store of inventories is represented in
a property document that is the visible sign of a vast hidden
process that connects all these assets to the rest of the
economy. Thanks to this representational process, assets
can lead an invisible, parallel life alongside their material
existence. They can be used as collateral for credit. The
single most important source of funds for new businesses in
WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV LV D PRUWJDJH RQ WKH HQWUHSUHQHXU·V
house. These asseWV FDQ DOVR SURYLGH D OLQN WR WKH RZQHU·V
credit history, an accountable address for collection of debts
and taxes, the basis for the creation of reliable and
universal public utilities, and a foundation for the creation
of securities (like mortgage-backed bonds) that can then be
rediscounted and sold in secondary markets. By this
process the West injects life into assets and makes them
generate capital.
DESOTO, supra, at 6.
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as represented by the deed, in the event of nonpayment on the
GHEWRUSURSHUW\ RZQHU·V SURPLVH WR UHSD\ WKH ORDQ The
mortgage simultaneously, when coupled with a promissory
note, represents rights to cash flow in terms of the principle
and interest to be paid back on the loan. All of these
documents can be recorded in the public records so that the
market for exchange expands to include people who are distant
from the parties to the underlying transaction. With verifiable
public records, distant creditors and potential future buyers
can extend funds to people with the appropriate documentation
of ownership without having personal knowledge of the
property or the parties involved.66 Moreover, an entirely new
set of transactions can be developed with respect to
representations in the form of mortgaged-backed securities.
These securities represent rights in the cash flow generated by
the underlying mortgages, which are themselves supported by
the underlying documentation that represents an ownership
claim to the property to which they make reference.
Consequently, one observes a market in the land and market
activity in the primary and secondary representations of the
land. The secondary mortgage market is essentially a market
in the representations of the representations of the value of the
underlying land transaction.
It is important to recognize that the market activity in the
documents is a derivative or induced market with respect to
the underlying transactions in the land itself.67 Thus, the
documentary or induced transactions are not living in some
binary and parallel universe with respect to the underlying
transaction;; these transactions are connected.
Two significant errors may arise from not appreciating the
deep connection between the underlying real estate transaction
and the market for mortgage-backed securities. First, one may
erroneously assume that the market for mortgage-backed
securities is independent of the underlying real estate
transaction. This may then lead one to believe that the
underlying transactions and the secondary market exchanges
  
66. See DESOTO, supra note 65, at 6.
67. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 83-85.
ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF MARKET PROCESS 42 (1992).

See also
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live parallel lives.68 As a consequence, attention is focused on
the securities market with little interest in looking back at the
fundamentals of the underlying mortgage markets, and this is
problematic because the quality of the underlying real estate
transaction establishes the real value of the securities that are
themselves representations of the underlying exchange. In
short, people dealing with mortgage-backed securities may
come to believe that property, itself, does not matter.
The second error occurs in thinking that the market values
of the induced transactions (those transactions in the
secondary market) are the same as those equilibrium values
predetermined by the relevant values of the underlying real
In other words, the first error is
estate transactions.69
compounded by believing that the value of the induced
transaction is basically the same as the value of the underlying
transaction such that one only needs to know the price of the
mortgaged-back security to assume the value of the underlying
real estate transaction. This is incorrect because the value of
the underlying real estate transaction expresses a degree of
freedom with respect to the price of the induced transaction, or
stated differently, the value of the induced transaction is not
fully determined by or covariant with the underlying
transaction.70 Consequently, buying and selling mortgage-
related securities at a good price and high profit does not mean
that the underlying real estate transactions are of similar good
value, nor even that they are economically sound. In other
words, the underlying real estate transaction should, but may
not, reflect the requisite value attributable to it by the
secondary market. Again, more attention needs to be paid to
the quality and value of the underlying real estate transactions
because they substantiate the expected market value of the
induced transactions in the secondary mortgage market.
A third problem with current mortgage market approaches
involves the devaluing and displacement of human judgment
  
68. See DESOTO, supra note 65, at 6 (´assets can lead an invisible,
parallel life DORQJVLGHWKHPDWHULDOH[LVWHQFHµ (emphasis added).
69. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 83-85. See also
ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF MARKET PROCESS 42 (1992).
70. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 83-85. See also
ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF MARKET PROCESS 42 (1992).
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and accountability in the loan origination process.71 Human
judgment has been replaced by mathematical models and
standardized credit scores. While there are concerns about the
potential for bias and unfair discrimination when using human
judgment, this should not mean that every decision must turn
on a mathematical calculation and the appearance of scientific
objectivity.72 The exercise of reasonable human judgment can
facilitate the origination of potentially higher quality loans.
Active involvement by lawyers, financial experts, and other
advisors can also raise the qualitative aspects of the lending
decision and its documentation. This is especially true when
participants are held accountable for the quality of their advice
and for the decisions that they make.
Currently, the underlying real estate transactions are
dominated by sales people with inadequate knowledge of the
law of property and real estate transactions.73 Transactions
are done on uniform documents that offer the pretence of
FRPSOHWHQHVVDQGDUHZULWWHQLQ´VLPSOH(QJOLVK.µ This masks
the fact that the legal consequences of the words in the
documents are not apparent to the typical reader, even though
the reader thinks the meaning is clear.74 Since everything is
on a pre-written form, there is little room for professional legal
judgment on behalf of the client. And even though title
examination and title insurance are supposed to be done on an
individually reviewed basis, the practice, in spite of the
regulation, is that everything is simply treated as a risk
factor.75 Instead of doing the work to examine and clean-up
  
71. See generally Cassandra Jones Havard, Democratizing Credit:
Examining the Structural Inequities of Subprime Lending, 56 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 233 (2006).
72. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 53-54.
73. See generally Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Sometimes Less is More: Utility,
Preemption, and Hermeneutical Criticisms of Proposed Federal Regulation of
Mortgage Brokers, 59 S.C. L. REV. 61 (2007).
74. See Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure:
The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 762-66 (2006).
75. Title insurance is meant to be issued based on an actual review of
the property and of all the property related records, with a specific conclusion
drawn as to the status of title for the specific piece of property. It is not
meant to be a simple risk-based insurance coverage. See MALLOY & SMITH,
supra note 27, at 269-91;; Robin Paul Malloy & Mark Klapow, Attorney
MalpractLFH IRU )DLOXUH WR 5HTXLUH )HH 2ZQHU·V 7LWOH ,QVXUDQFH LQ D
Residential Real Estate Transaction, 74 ST. JOHN·S L. REV. 407, 427-28, 439-
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title problems the way it should be done, many insurers simply
insure the risk of a potential transaction going bad.
In a similar way, lenders have changed the way they do
business. Lenders now deal with uniform documents and
numeric credit scores, use minimal or no back-up
documentation, and retain little or no ownership interest in the
loans they originate.76 These lenders no longer function as
simple intermediaries between savers and borrowers;; they
function as complex financial institutions offering a wide range
of products and services. In this lending environment, the
residential housing market is simply a paper-churning process
engaged in to generate fee and service income with the vast
majority of mortgages being sold into the secondary market.
This new arrangement eliminates a great deal of human
judgment with respect to the quality of the loan and the credit
worthiness of the borrower.
In the current (pre-meltdown) environment of the
secondary mortgage market, judgment and accountability have
EHHQWUDGHGIRUWKH´HIILFLHQF\µRIKLJKYROXPHDQGWKHPDNLQJ
of risk contracts to cover losses²risk contracts that apparently
failed to account for the low quality of the underlying real
estate transaction.
IV. Fixing the Primary Market
From a primary market perspective, there are a number of
steps that can be taken to improve the soundness of housing
and mortgage markets as they impact secondary mortgage
market operations. This section of the Article addresses three
areas in which specific steps can be taken. These areas
involve: taking steps to reduce speculation in housing prices;;
  
40 (2000). See also Robin Paul Malloy, Using Title Insurance to Avoid
Malpractice and Protect Clients in a Changing Marketplace, 11 THE DIGEST
51, 55 (2003) (noting that 25% of real estate transactions involve a title
problem).
76. See Brescia, supra note 49, at 289-90;; Julia Patterson Forrester,
Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage Instruments: The Forgotten
Benefit to Homeowners, 72 MO. L. REV. 1077, 1083-87 (2007);; Schuster, supra
note 49, at 155-58;; Willis, supra note 74, at 715-721. See generally Peter M.
Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency Home Finance
Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765 (2005).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/15

28

2009]

MORTGAGE MARKET REFORM

107

reducing incentives to over-borrow and over-lend;; and dealing
ZLWK DQ LQYHUVH SULVRQHU·V GLOHPPD SUREOHP E\ UH-
professionalizing the underlying real estate transaction.
A. Curbing Housing Market Speculation
When one examines the problems driving the crisis in
mortgage markets and mortgage-backed securities, it is
difficult to underestimate the role of housing market
speculation. Speculation as to the never-ending rise in future
home values was the foundation for numerous investment
missteps.77 Borrowers were convinced that they could afford
more house than they could pay for and that they could take on
DOO NLQGV RI GHEW LQFOXGLQJ ´WR[LF ORDQVµ ZLWK QHJDWLYH
amortization and exploding interest rates, because the future
rise in value of the property would more than cover any present
disparity in ability to pay.78 Lenders also let their guards
down, feeling that future increases in housing prices would
cover any risk not otherwise spread and passed off through the
Mortgage brokers and
secondary mortgage market.79
originators took advantage of the situation to put people into
bigger loans and earn higher dollar payout commissions.80
  
77. Speculation and market bubbles have been problems for centuries.
See generally, e.g., Christian C. Day, Paper Conspiracies and the End of All
Good Order: Perceptions and Speculation in Early Capital Markets, 1
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 283 (2006).
78. See Kirstin Downey, Non-Traditional Loans Require Financial
Discipline, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2006, at F10;; Kenneth R. Harney, Those
Interest-Only Loans May Turn Toxic for Some, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 2004, at 2.
79. See generally Georgette C. Poindexter, Subordinated Rolling Equity:
Analyzing Real Estate Loan Default in the Era of Securitization, 50 EMORY
L.J. 519 (2001).
80. For example, a borrower might qualify for a $300,000 conventional
mortgage yet be strongly encouraged to apply for a $500,000 subprime loan.
The idea or sales pitch behind this is that the buyer will get ownership of a
higher valued property with the larger loan and gain from greater leverage
and control of a more valuable asset. If one assumes (as a speculator) that
market prices for the property will rise at a fast rate, then more is to be
gained by using more leverage, and the rapidly rising equity will more than
cover getting the buyer out from the burden of a subprime loan with profit on
a sale or a refinance in relatively short order. Of course, the key here is that
prices have to keep rising as fast as or faster than assumed. In any event,
the loan originator pockets a higher commission based on the percent applied
to the larger loan. After closing the deal the failure of any expectations as to
future prices falls on the borrower, not the loan originator.
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In evaluating the role of speculation and overly optimistic
speculation of future housing prices, I start from the view that
the basic residential housing policy in America is about
securing a reasonable opportunity for homeownership for as
realistically large a percentage of the population as possible.
In stating this I recognize two things. First, not everyone in
America will be able to enjoy the same type of housing
ownership because fee ownership of single family housing is
expensive. This means that we have to simultaneously work
harder to create more varieties of home ownership and
improved leasehold tenure. And second, it also means that the
implicit goal of the American housing policy is and has been
about home ownership and not property speculation.
One of the underlying problems leading up to the
meltdown in home mortgage markets has been due to the
inherent tension of inconsistent government policies;; one policy
seeks to make housing affordable and accessible with a vast
network of direct and indirect government support systems,
while the other facilitates speculation and get-rich-quick
schemes from the very same housing products.81 These two
goals are inherently inconsistent. Residential housing is
supported by a vast array of public funding because we want
people to have an ownership interest in the places where they
live, not because we want to make them venture capitalists.
Supporting homeownership with public dollars requires a
stable program whereas promoting homeownership as a
primary source of wealth accumulation fosters speculation and
risk.
A key step that can be taken to reduce speculation and
undermine the incentive to flip properties is one of eliminating
gains from equity appreciation in the early years of home
ownership.82 This can be done by taxing away the realization
of equity appreciation gains from a sale during a stated time
  
81. For a discussion of federal housing policy, see Emerson, supra note
35, at 421-30;; and Forrester, supra note 35, at 393-419.
82. 2QH SUREOHP LV ´IOLSSLQJ,µ ZKHUH D KRXVH LV SXUFKDVHG DQG WKHQ
resold in a very short period of time in order to gain from speculation or from
pumping up an appraisal. One way to reduce the incentive for this kind of
speculative activity is to put a significant tax on the realization of equity
appreciation when and if the property is sold within a designated period. No
tax is due in the absence of a triggering event, such as a sale or refinance,
within the regulated time period.
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period. In order to make the equity appreciation tax more
viable from a constitutional perspective it should probably be a
step down tax so that the tax rate decreases at the end of each
year of ownership.
Thus, one might tax any equity
appreciation for the first five years of ownership with step
down rates like: 95% in year 1;; 80% in year 2;; 70% in year 3;;
45% in year 4;; 20% in year 5;; and 0% thereafter. Vermont is a
state with such a program in place to reduce speculation, and
challenges to it have been unsuccessful, as the state·V courts
have held that the law is constitutional and supported by a
rational public purpose.83 The main point here, however, is not
to endorse any particular approach, such as the Vermont tax,
but rather to develop some kind of a tax that reduces
speculation.
The main justification for this is that the public, through
indirect government subsidy of the credit and mortgage
markets, subsidizes residential housing;; it is thus fair and
reasonable for government to manage equity speculation. This
management would be focused on the early years of home
ownership and any limitations on gain would be offset by the
potential for greater stability and predictability in the longer-
run mortgage markets. This kind of equity accumulation
constraint is nothing more than what we often demand of low-
income buyers who rely on a variety of direct subsidy programs
to acquire so-called affordable homeownership.84 There is no
  
83. See generally, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 §§10001-10007 (2009);;
Andrews v. Lathrop, 315 A.2d. 860 (Vt. 1974);; Karl E. Case, Taxes and
Speculative Behavior in Land and Real Estate Markets, in 4 REV. URB. &
REGIONAL DEV. STUD. 226 (pt. 2) (July 1992);; Thomas L. Daniels et al., The
Vermont Land Gains Tax: Experience With It Provides a Useful Lesson in the
Design of Modern Land Policy, 45 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 441 (1986);; Dennis
Robinson & Elizabeth M. Chant, Interaction of Land Policy and Land-Based
Tax Policy: The Vermont Land Gains Tax, in 4 REV. URB. & REGIONAL STUD.
147 (pt. 2) (July 1992);; A Special Report on Vermont Real Estate Taxes, VT.
PROP. OWNERS REP. (Vermont Real Estate Today, Montpelier, VT.) (Supp.),
Sept. 2006.
84. Here, I simply point out that we already have housing programs that
FRQVWUDLQRUUHVWULFWRQH·VFODLPWRIXWXUHHTXLW\DSSUHFLDWLRQ*LYHQWKLVLW
should not be considered alien to suggest that such constraints or restrictions
apply to other and broader categories of residential housing. For an example
of the kind of general restriction on housing equity that I am referring to, see
generally AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, supra
note 25;; JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, NAT·L HOUS. INST., SHARED EQUITY HOME
OWNERSHIP: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF RE-SALE RESTRICTED, OWNER-
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apparent reason to treat low-income borrowers receiving direct
subsidies any different than higher-income debtors privileged
by indirect subsidies.
Such an equity appreciation tax would be similar in its
goal to that of a Tobin tax.85 Each attempts to reduce short-
term speculation while retaining long-term benefits of
exchange. The Tobin tax deals with speculation in cross
country currency trades, whereas the equity appreciation tax
seeks to reduce the incentive for quick and speculative trades
in housing markets.86 There would be no incentive for housing
flips (often done within a short-time of the original transaction)
if there is no immediate equity gain to be realized. This not
only cools down speculation and a major rationale for over-
borrowing and over-lending, but it also undermines one of the
biggest elements of fraud in the housing market.
Importantly, such a tax does not take away or diminish the
value of the property;; the tax only goes to equity appreciation
over the stated period of time, and it is triggered only by an
event such as a resale within the stated time period. If a buyer
paid a fair market price, he should be able to get that back
even if he sells during the first five years. The main point is
that we should encourage home ownership and stability in
communities while undermining the incentives for speculation
and fraud in housing and mortgage markets.
Other steps could be taken to supplement this anti-
speculation idea. These can include elimination of the tax
benefits for interest deductions on home mortgages, or to at
  
OCCUPIED HOUSING (2006);; EMILY THANDEN, VANDERBILT UNIV. CMTY.
RESEARCH & ACTION PROGRAM, SHARED EQUITY HOMEOWNERSHIP: SHARING THE
COSTS & BENEFITS (2008), available at http://www.thda.org/govsummit/
presentations/Shared%20Equity%20Homeownership%20Sharing%20the%20
Costs%20Benefits.pdf;; and Thomas J. Miceli et al., The Role of Limited-
Equity Cooperatives in Providing Affordable Housing, 5 HOUSING POL·Y
DEBATE 469 (1994).
85. For a quick explanation of the Tobin tax, which taxes away quick
gains on currency speculation, see TOBIN TAX INITIATIVE, FACT SHEET ON
TOBIN TAXES, http://www.ceedweb.org/iirp/factsheet.htm (last visited Oct. 16,
2009). See also generally Thomas I. Palley, Speculation and Tobin Taxes:
Why Sand in the Wheels Can Increase Economic Efficiency, 69 J. Econ. 113
(1999) (Austria).
86. See TOBIN TAX INITIATIVE, supra note 85. See also generally Palley,
supra note 85.
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least suspend it for the first several years of ownership.87 The
deduction is not needed as we can observe similar
homeownership rates in countries such as Canada where there
is no special tax benefit for mortgage interest payments.88 The
actual result of the mortgage interest deduction is that it
encourages wealthier Americans to buy bigger homes than
needed in order to get a tax shelter. This is bad in itself since
it encourages over use of resources and promotes bigger and
increasingly more negative impacts on the environment than
would otherwise be demanded by housing consumers.
B. Reducing the Incentive to Over-Borrow and Over-Lend
There are a number of steps that might be taken to reduce
the incentives for bad loans in the primary market. In this
section of the Article, I consider two areas where effective
action can be taken. These areas deal with the commission
structure for loan origination and the transferring of
accountability in the selling of loans to the secondary market.
In the primary market, buyers of property frequently need
or opt for mortgage financing. In seeking a mortgage, they
generally deal with an originating mortgage broker or with a
loan officer at a lending institution. These loan originators
typically work on some combination of salary and commission
with commission incentives weighing heavily as the key
incentive for compensation. Working for points as a percentage
of the loan amount, the loan originators have an incentive to
qualify borrowers and to push them into larger loans.89 For
example, if the originator earns 2% on each new loan
origination, she can double her return by getting a borrower to
take a more risky loan of $300,000 rather than a $150,000 loan
  
87. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST
DEDUCTION, PUBLICATION 936 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p936.pdf.
88. Homeownership rates are similar in the United States and Canada,
even though Canada does not allow a tax break for mortgage interest
deductions and it requires a 20% down payment, or else mortgage insurance
must be acquired. See Marie-Josee Kravis, 5HJXODWLRQ'LGQ·W6DYH&DQDGD·V
Banks, WALL ST. J., MAY 7, 2009, at A17;; Mann, supra note 35, at 1385-86;;
CAN. MORTGAGE & HOUS. CORP., HOMEOWNERSHIP MARKET, http://www.cmhc-
schl.gc.ca/en/corp/about/cahoob/data/data_003.cfm (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
89. See generally Brescia, supra note 49;; Havard, supra note 71.
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that is more readily affordable. This accounts in part for the
fact that some 35% of subprime loans went to people who could
have purchased a home on a mortgage they could afford but
instead opted for a much larger loan on subprime terms.
This push for moving borrowers to loans with larger dollar
amounts is also incentivized by the fact that it cost about the
same amount in terms of time and paperwork to process a
small loan as it does a larger loan. Therefore, to produce
favorable economies of scale, effort is expended toward
originating large loans rather than small ones, again
incentivizing the pushing of borrowers into riskier debt
positions. One way to reduce this perverse incentive structure
is to eliminate commissions on loan origination. Since the
work and time required on all of these home loans is similar,
all originations should be done on a flat fee basis²perhaps a
few hundred dollars per loan without regard to the loan
amount.90
A related problem arises from the tax code and the way it
incentivizes over-borrowing by rewarding debtors for taking on
larger loans to produce higher tax benefits.91 The incentive
structure works to encourage the purchase of larger and more
expensive homes. The irony, of course, is that to the extent
that housing markets are efficient, the future tax benefit will
be discounted and built into the present value pricing of the
home. This means that housing is more expensive than it
otherwise would be since home buyers have to pay now for the
future stream of tax benefits, and this arrangement favors the
middle and upper class while making initial homeownership
that much more difficult for people with lower incomes. It is a
straight-out subsidy for the middle and upper classes with
little evidence that it substantially helps expand home
ownership rates, in spite of the assertions of real estate
salespeople.
A second area of concern involves lender accountability.
Here I have two key suggestions. Each suggestion goes to the
matter of keeping loan originating institutions accountable for
  
90. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 53-55.
91. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. The IRS mortgage
interest tax deduction is an incentive to borrow more in order to get a higher
offsetting deduction from a bigger loan.
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the loans that they originate. One suggestion deals with
recourse liability on the loans that are sold to the secondary
market, and the second deals with the elimination of the
deficiency judgment in the event of a default and foreclosure
against a borrower with little or no equity in the transaction.92
A problem fostered by the secondary mortgage market is
the reduction in accountability of primary lenders when they
sell mortgages to the secondary market. The lack of a
continuing ownership interest and direct responsibility for loan
risk reduces long-term accountability for making bad lending
decisions. When lenders hold the mortgages they originate,
they have a stronger interest in making sure the loans are well
supported in the first instance. One way to bring back greater
accountability is to require lenders to retain an ownership
interest in their loans even after they are sold, or to make all
such loan sales recourse. Making all such sales recourse would
be different from requiring the lender to keep an ownership
interest but it would still add to accountability because all bad
loans and debt would remain a contingent liability of the
originating lender.
Related to this approach is to eliminate DOHQGHU·VULJKWWR
a deficiency judgment against a defaulting borrower.93
Currently most state laws dealing with foreclosure permit a
lender to sue a defaulting borrower for any deficiency between
the amount owed on the mortgage loan and the amount that
the property brings in at a foreclosure sale.94 One way to make
the lender more cautious about the quality of the loan in the
first instance is to eliminate the right to seek a deficiency
judgment in the event of default and foreclosure. This would
make the lender look entirely to the land for recovery of the
  
92. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Jones, Deficiency Judgments and the Exercise
of the Default Option in Home Mortgage Loans, 36 J. L. & ECON. 115, 135
(1993);; Todd J. Sywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of
Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 30-35, 41-45 (2009). See also
MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 447-77 (discussing foreclosure). See
generally John Mixon, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Home Mortgage Documents
Interpreted as Nonrecourse Debt (with Poetic Comments Lifted from Carl
Sandburg), 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 35 (2008).
93. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 447-77 (discussing
foreclosure). See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 28 (same).
94. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 447-77 (discussing
foreclosure). See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 28 (same).
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debt in the event of default. Therefore, lenders would have
increased incentives to get fair and honest appraisals of the
properties when making loan decisions.
This limitation on deficiency judgments could be
structured in one of two ways: it could be an across-the-board
elimination of this remedy, or it could be applied to particular
loan standards. As to particular loan standards, it might be
that a rule would state that the right to a deficiency judgment
is limited to loans in which the borrower had at least a 20%
equity interest in the property at the time of the mortgage.
7KLV ZRXOG LQFOXGH WKH HOLPLQDWLRQ RI ´SLJJ\ EDFNµ PRUWJDJHV
where lenders ´pretendµ that a borrower has 20% equity by
making two simultaneous loans;; one for 80% as a first
mortgage and one for 20% as a second loan.95 This two-step
process has been used to get around the need for private
mortgage insurance (PMI) by papering a file to look like there
is 20% equity when in fact 100% of the property value is
mortgaged.96
Similarly, deficiency judgments could be eliminated in
situations where a lender chose to use a high risk or complex
mortgage loan form, such as one with negative amortization,
open-ended (no cap) adjustable interest rates, or one based on
so-called low documentation. Another alternative would be to
simply exclude such loans from the secondary market and
require originating lenders to hold them in their own loan
portfolios.
C. $GGUHVVLQJDQ,QYHUVH3ULVRQHU·V'LOHPPD3UREOHPLQthe
Underlying Real Estate Transaction
Correcting the secondary mortgage market requires that
we also attend to problems manifesting themselves in the
  
95. See Sywicki & Adamson, supra note 92, at 41-43;; Edmund L.
Andrews, Most Homeowners Not Overly in Debt, Fed Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 2005, at C1.
96. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 399 (discussing piggyback
mortgages). See also Simon, supra note 61 (stating that ´[t]he share of
borrowers with prime jumbo loans who took out a ¶piggyback· second
mortgage ² which allowed borrowers to finance more than 80% of their
KRPH·VYDOXHZLWKRXWSULYDWHPRUWJDJHLQVXUDQFH ² climbed to a record 33%
LQµ).
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primary market, at the intersection of the underlying real
estate transaction and the loan origination process. One source
of problems here is related to what I think of as an inverse
SULVRQHU·V GLOHPPD SUREOHP  ,Q WKH VWDQGDUG SULVRQHU·V
dilemma we confront a situation in which transacting parties
confront various transaction costs which drive them to take
non-cooperative positions resulting in inefficiencies, and these
inefficiencies generate less than optimal social benefits.97 In
WKH VWDQGDUG DQDO\VLV RI WKH SULVRQHU·V GLOHPPD, efforts are
undertaken to use law to reduce the interfering transaction
costs so that the transacting parties will cooperate and
negotiate to an efficient exchange relationship. In the current
(pre-meltdown) environment a number of problems can be
EHWWHUXQGHUVWRRGE\WKLQNLQJLQWHUPVRIDQLQYHUVHSULVRQHU·V
dilemma.98 To a significant degree, the problem in the primary
mortgage market is one of cooperation rather than failure to
cooperate.
The incentive structure of the underlying
transaction favors cooperation in misbehavior and fraud.99 In
papering fraudulent transactions with hyped up appraisals,
bad surveys, and simultaneous flips, it takes more than one
participant to succeed.100 The underlying transactions have
  
97. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 130-32 (discussing
WKHSULVRQHU·VGLOHPPD See generally McAdams, supra note 5.
98. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 130-32 (discussing
WKHSULVRQHU·VGLOHPPD See generally McAdams, supra note 5.
99. See generally Brescia, supra note 49, at 292;; Gretchen Morgenson,
Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, at 3.1;; Bob
Tedeschi, Report Piles Blame on Brokers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2008, at RE10;;
Julie Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, A Mortgage Crisis Begins to Spiral, and the
Causalities Mount, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2007, at C1;; Kathleen Day, Villains in
the Mortgage Mess? Start at Wall Street. Keep Going, WASH. POST, June 1,
2008, at B1.
100. See, e.g., Michael M. Phillips, Would You Pay $103,000 for This
Arizona Fixer-Upper? ² 7KDW:DV0V+DOWHUPDQ·V0RUWJDJHRQ,W, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 3, 2009, at A1. The article chronicles the financing of a property
valued at $15,000 for $103,000 to a woman who had been without a job for 13
years and whose only source of income was welfare and food stamps. Id. For
a fee of $350 an appraiser valued the house at $132,000 without ever looking
at it. Id. The house was condemned with a notice stapled to the wall, stating
that it was ´XQILWIRUKXPDQRFFXSDWLRQ.µ Id. The mortgage was originated
by a small mortgage firm named Integrity (a firm located in Arizona), and it
collected $6,153 in fees for the origination. Id. The loan was sold to Wells
Fargo and then to the London-based HSBC. Id. The mortgage was then
bundled with 4,050 other mortgages and used as collateral for a security
issued in July, 2007. Id.
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basically become degraded and corrupt, and there is a need for
legal action to reduce the incentive to cooperate among the
misbehaving participants.
In this section of the Article I focus on the underlying real
estate transaction and suggest ways to reduce the incentive to
cooperate in degraded transactions by changing the existing
exchange relationships.
There are several steps to be taken to improve the quality
of the underlying real estate transaction which is important to
also improve the quality of the securities issued in the
VHFRQGDU\ PRUWJDJH PDUNHW  7KHVH LQFOXGH ´ULJKW ILWWLQJµ WKH
professional expertise needed to properly structure and close a
real estate transaction, making the work and fees for services
more transparent and providing incentives for participants in
the underlying transaction to report misbehavior and fraud.
In a typical real estate transaction involving residential
housing, there are three primary elements;; one involves the
selling of the house as a consumer good, a second involves the
transfer and conveyance of all of the relevant property
interests, and the third involves the legal arrangements for
structured mortgage financing. Two of these areas require the
expertise and knowledge of a professional licensed attorney;;
one requires the skill of a professional real estate salesperson.
The process of selling a house as a consumer good is one
that is best handled by a real estate salesperson: marketing
issues must be attended to and knowledge of current consumer
tastes and preferences is needed. The salesperson develops a
strategy for highlighting the important features of the house
and establishes a plan for connecting potential buyers with
hopeful sellers. This is an important intermediary function.
In the American housing market the problem is that real
estate salespeople have been allowed to function in areas in
which they are not fully qualified. The important tasks of
drafting a purchase and sale contract and of understanding the
details of conveyancing and title are beyond the realm of a
VDOHVSHUVRQ·VH[SHUWLVH101 While most salespeople believe they
  
101. There is, after all, a reason that people go to law school and get
licensed to understand the legal aspects of property law, foreclosure law, and
real estate transactions. Non-lawyers do not fully appreciate the legal
implications of these transactions. Policy in this area seems to be shaped by
a simple desire to reduce transaction costs by dramatically reducing and even
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know property law and the law of real estate transactions, this
belief is simply unfounded. The skill set and knowledge of real
estate sales has little to do with understanding the details and
nuances of property and mortgage law. Salespeople also step
outside of their area of expertise in addressing the structuring
of mortgage financing. Some salespeople understand the
economic implications of particular financing arrangements but
lack knowledge of the legal and property implications of
mortgage law, including the law of default and foreclosure,
which must be assessed up front when advising borrowers.
More importantly, salespeople lack the professional licensing of
a lawyer that provides consumers with important information
DERXW WKH LQGLYLGXDO·V Wraining and knowledge, and which
makes the individual liable for a particular standard of care
and conduct as governed under the law and by the Rules of
Professional Responsibility.
$V WR WKH LQYHUVH SULVRQHU·V GLOHPPD SUREOHP WKH UHDO
estate salesperson and the loan originator often function as
gatekeepers for coordinating ancillary services provided by
such parties as appraisers, surveyors, and title insurers. Today
many salespeople not only prepare the purchase and sales
contract but also connect the buyer to a loan originator and the
other ancillary service providers. In this role as gatekeeper,
the salesperson, like the loan originator, is driven by making a
sale and earning a commission. Even when good intentions are
in play, the incentive structure works to facilitate cooperation
in a sense that is not always positive. Appraisers, title
companies, and surveyors know that their business is
contingent upon cooperation with the gatekeepers who deal in
volume. Being cut out of the transaction because one is
SHUFHLYHG DV EHLQJ GLIILFXOW WR ZRUN ZLWK WRR FDXWLRXV D ´GHDO
NLOOHUµ E\ VORZLQJ XS WKH GHDO RU IRU IROORZLQJ SUDFWLFH
guidelines that cost more than the services others will provide,
means the end of a profitable business relationship. Many
business players in the residential market depend on referrals
and inclusion by the gatekeepers in order to make a living.
Competition that is not properly policed and regulated,
  
eliminating lawyers from a meaningful role in the exchange. This has been
done without careful consideration of the consequences, such as the
continuing degradation of primary market transactions.

39

118

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:79

therefore, often results in an incentive to cut corners and go
along so that everyone makes money, even if the deal is
degraded and unsound.
One of the key underlying problems, of course, involves
The borrowers in these
asymmetrical information.102
transactions have inferior information and typically less
knowledge than the parties who are regular participants in the
networks of primary and secondary mortgage market
financing. Consequently, the consumer is in no real position to
police or even fully understand the weaknesses of the system in
which she is operating. This weakness is not corrected by
government requirements for pages of disclosure information,
which most people do not really bother to read or understand,
especially since salespeople generally are willing to offer a
watered down assurance of everything as being just fine. It is
difficult and perhaps even economically irrational for
consumers to spend their time and effort actually overcoming
the asymmetrical information problem such that we cannot
rely on consumers to correct the market on their own;; public
regulation is required. Moreover, the idea that the buying,
selling, and financing of property in the United States is
dominated by salespeople with no professional qualifications in
law is difficult to believe, and it fosters exchange relationships
that create mutual incentives for degraded cooperation²
cooperation that, unless heavily policed and regulated, leads to
potentially toxic externality costs for mortgage and financial
markets.
To a large extent the legal profession in the United States
is at fault here for its willingness to continuously erode its
professional duty in the area of real estate transactions.103
Gradually the courts have granted more and more authority to
non-lawyers to operate in areas of property law²areas in
which non-lawyers are not properly trained, educated, or
  
102. See MALLOY, MARKET CONTEXT, supra note 4, at 169-72 (discussing
asymmetrical information).
103. The profession has ceded ground to non-lawyers in the basic real
estate transaction, and lawyers have become meaningless participants when
used because gatekeepers have worked to keep lawyer compensation so low
that almost no lawyer can actually afford to spend the time doing competent
legal work on the file. Exceptions would be when a lawyer represents a high-
income buyer of a very expensive home, where the buyer understands the
complexity, and is willing to pay.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/15
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regulated.
My recommendations here are that sales
professionals should confine their work to sales and all contract
drafting, title evaluation, mortgage advising and closing of real
estate transactions must be done by licensed real estate
lawyers. In order to make this a reality, there must be a
return to earlier requirements as to the definition of the
practice of law, with strong prosecution of the unauthorized
practice of law.
Returning lawyers to the transaction will beneficially alter
the exchange relationship of the transaction. Lawyers are not
salespeople and they have expertise in the underlying subject
matter of the sale and the mortgage financing.
More
importantly, they are advocates who understand the
transactional benefits of an adversarial process.
They
understand that some transaction costs generate positive social
externalities.104 The attorney does not work on a commission,
does not rely on the closing of the transaction to earn a fee, and
is held to a professional code of conduct that reduces the
incentive for participation in transactional misbehavior. If all
parties are represented by attorneys at the closing, a rare
VLWXDWLRQ LQ WRGD\·V PDUNHWSODFH WKHUH LV OLNHO\ WR EH D PXFK
higher quality transaction and thus a higher quality basis for
the derivative transactions in the mortgage-backed securities
markets.
In this context, legislation and professional
regulations need to prohibit real estate people from engaging in
activities that go beyond sales work, and the meaning of sales
work should go back to earlier definitions when sales people
were not permitted to complete contracts, fill in legal forms, or
provide mortgage advice. In addition, lawyers and salespeople
should be prohibited from representing more than one party to
a transaction and from splitting or sharing fees and
commissions.
Naturally, in order to effectively bring lawyers back into
the residential transaction to perform a substantive and
purposeful role rather than a perfunctory one, the transactions
have to make economic sense. It is here that we need a change
in belief and understanding on the part of the general public.
  
104. See David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of
Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of
Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 109 (2005).
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It is ridiculous for salespeople to be collecting $7,000, $10,000,
or more, in commissions at a closing while buyers, sellers, and
lenders cringe at the thought of paying a lawyer $200. The
public has been fooled into thinking that salespeople can do the
job of a lawyer and that there is nothing to be gained from
compensating a lawyer for active participation in the full scope
of the exchange. Lawyers need to get back to playing a central
role in these transactions and they have to make a living wage
from doing this work if it is to have any substantive value.
Admittedly not every lawyer is an expert in real estate just
because he or she has a law degree. Therefore, law schools and
the Bar should develop a specialized area of practice in real
estate conveyancing, with a special certification and
requirements for annual education updates. These specialized
lawyers would handle all residential real estate transactions
and be subject to certification and periodic evaluation and
review. They would need to be well-qualified in such subjects
as contract, property, and mortgage law, including foreclosure,
and appropriate federal housing regulations. In addition, they
would need to know title examination, title insurance,
condominium and common property ownership law, negotiable
instruments, electronic fund transfers, secured transactions,
local land use and zoning law, implications for bankruptcy, and
they would need to have basic knowledge of surveys and
appraisals. Only certified conveyancing lawyers would be
allowed to handle residential transactions involving funds
drawn on, and mortgages funded by federally chartered or
insured institutions, or any institution that sells mortgage-
related instruments into the secondary markets. States could,
of course, further regulate this practice with respect to funds
drawn from, or mortgages made by, state institutions and with
private funding. Commercial real estate transactions would be
excluded from these specific regulations for the time being.105
In terms of compensation, lawyers and salespeople should
each charge for services on an hourly basis and prepare a
detailed statement supporting the bill. This would provide
more information and make the process more transparent.
  
105. The concerns in a commercial real estate transaction are different.
In these transactions, lawyers are still significant participants and the clients
are typically much better informed than those in the residential home
market. There is also less of a problem with asymmetrical information.
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Percentage commissions make no sense because they often
bear no relationship to the work performed, provide no detailed
billing information as to service performed, and encourage
pushing buyers into bigger and more expensive homes and
mortgages. Percentage billing on real estate sales commissions
simply facilitates the kind of problems we see elsewhere in the
primary market for real estate transactions and finance.
In addition, there should be an incentive structure to
encourage participants in a transaction to report misbehavior
and fraud to the proper law enforcement authorities. For
example, a person reporting the use of hyped appraisals or
questionable and simultaneous flips might be rewarded with
triple the amount of the closing costs plus attorney fees and
costs. This, or something like it, would help break the
degraded cooperation that has undermined the soundness of
the mortgage markets. We might also require that residential
housing loans be funded by specially charted and registered
financial institutions doing nothing but residential mortgages.
Making these changes may increase the cost of closing a
given transaction, but then it may save much more than it
costs by dramatically improving market outcomes. In other
words, increased costs on the individual underlying
transactions can nonetheless generate positive externalities for
society that far exceed the costs.106 Avoiding the hundreds of
billions of dollars in catastrophic losses that we are now
experiencing would be worth slight increases in the cost of
performing the underlying transactions.107 There are a number
of values and factors to consider in comparing overall costs and
benefits at the individual micro level and the broader macro
level. People just need to face up to the fact that there are
expenses and transaction costs that accompany buying and
owning a home. These include paying reasonable attorney fees
and confronting a given set of transaction costs that lead to
positive social benefits for the entire system.
If we are worried about rising transaction costs and we
want to assist people in buying a first home, we should avoid
subsidizing them in ways that push them into economically
  
106. See Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 104, at 109.
107. Worldwide losses on bad loans and securitization are estimated to
be $4.1 trillion. See Maurer & Linblad, supra note 22.
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unsound mortgage relationships and that unnecessarily
degrade the mortgage market. It is better to get them into
mortgages where they can afford the monthly payments and
subsidize them in terms of the closing cost of getting into a first
home. There can be multiple ways of doing this and here I
suggest one way. We can establish a program that provides
qualifying first-time home buyers with an earned income credit
for closing costs directly related to professional services up to
$5,000.108
This earned income credit would apply to
professional services billed on an hourly rate with an itemized
receipt and could include attorney fees, real estate sales and
broker fees (if the service is fully billed on an itemized hourly
basis without commission and then coverable up to $1,500),
title examination, and survey fees. Eligible buyers would be
first-time home buyers earning up to 110% of the median
income in the standard metropolitan statistical area in which
the home is located. A program such as this would assist
people with the difficult task of saving enough money to cover
the closing costs, and thus make it easier to move from renting
to ownership while still focusing on sound fundamentals in
evaluating the willingness and ability to pay the debt service
on the actual mortgage.109
V. Conclusion
The current financial crisis is a complex one with many
causes. Many of the problems observed in the secondary
mortgage market can be traced back to weaknesses in the
underlying real estate transaction and the exchange
relationships in the primary market. Therefore, as we think
about the future of financial regulation and mortgage markets
we must look carefully at the underlying exchange. The
  
108. An earned income tax credit provides a direct benefit to the
taxpayer in the amount earned. The amount can be determined based on a
number of factors;; I suggest $5,000 as a reasonable starting point to offset
closing costs for the first-time homebuyer, to the extent that these costs
might increase by returning lawyers back to a role of substantive
participation in the underlying real estate transaction. The suggested dollar
amount is not the critical point;; rather, it is the idea of using this kind of
mechanism to assist people with the cost of getting into their first home.
109. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 368.
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quality of the primary market transaction drives the potential
results that we can expect in the secondary market. With low
quality going into the system, we will certainly get low quality
coming out.
Thus, planning for the future of financial
regulation must include planning for the underlying real estate
transaction.
As suggested in this Article, there are several steps that
can and should be taken to improve the quality of the primary
market in real estate transactions. First and foremost, we
must come to realize the fallacy of the asserted ideology of self-
correcting markets. Instead of waiting for under-regulated
markets to correct themselves, we must develop volitional and
purposeful regulation of housing and mortgage markets. We
also need to take steps to curb speculation in housing prices,
reduce incentives for over-borrowing and over-lending, and
restructure the underlying exchange relationships to avoid the
SUREOHPVRIDQLQYHUVHSULVRQHU·VGLOHPPD7DNLQJVXFKVWHSV
may cause a rise in the closing expenses in the underlying real
estate transaction but overall social benefits will increase as
more certainty and stability govern the markets and as fewer
incentives exist to promote people to over-borrow or to
participate in fraud.
The fact is that buying and owning a home are expensive.
Not everyone can afford the same type of home ownership. We
need to fix the broken parts of our current market and we need
to develop more and better types of housing opportunities that
provide a sense of ownership and the benefits that go with it.
Simply trying to put people into homes that they cannot afford
does no one any good.
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